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Perceptions of corruption in Flanders: surveying citizens and police. A 
study on the influence of occupational differential association on 
perceptions of corruption 
This study is specifically designed to illustrate the differences between 
occupational status groups in the perception of corruption. Perceptions of 
corruption are studied in the present article using a theoretical framework based 
on Sutherland’s differential association theory. A questionnaire was sent to 2,256 
Flemish citizens and 350 police officers. The core of the questionnaire was a set 
of 15 items describing potentially corrupt situations. The results indicate that the 
process of occupational differential association tends to influence people’s 
perceptions of corruption. This study provides empirical support for an 
organisational explanation of how normative conflict in society translates into 
specific corruption resistance within different occupational status groups. 
 
Introduction 
Social networks are places where perceptions of corruption are created. A pan-
European study in eight countries on the cultural construction of crime revealed that 
different groups share different perceptions of corruption (Tänzler et al. 2012). The 
meaning of corruption varies in our society between distinct groups. The police and the 
judicial services apply an institutionalised legal framework to guide their perceptions of 
corruption. The media reflects a much broader concept, and applies the term corruption 
to define all kinds of public situations that are the result of bad governance. Johnston 
(1986) and Redlawsk and McCann (2005) offered a pertinent explanation for class-
based differences in the judgement of corrupt situations, using an interest-based 
argument. Lower and middle ranked groups might disapprove benefits and privileges 
from the government that ‘are seen by higher status groups as merely the fruits of merit 
and expertise’ (Johnston 1986: 387). Jackson and Smith (1996) considered the different 
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ways in which politicians and citizens perceive acts of ‘political’ corruption. Politicians 
were more tolerant of corruption than citizens. In a previous paper, we analysed 
variations in the perception of corruption in the Belgian region of Flanders (XX 2013). 
The main finding was that perceptions coincide with the relevant opportunities, 
networks and skills to which people have access because of their occupational status.  
The present article will further investigate perceptions of corruption, using a 
theoretical framework based on Sutherland’s differential association theory. This theory 
consists of three interrelated concepts: normative conflict, differential association and 
differential social organisation (Sutherland 1967; Sutherland et al. 1992). The concept 
of differential association assumes that individuals learn the skills and definitions of 
deviance within intimate groups. The influence of the process of differential association 
has been analysed in a previous paper (XX 2013). The theoretical perspective that 
differential association is interrelated with the ‘process of differential social 
organisation’ is addressed in the present article. This concept of differential social 
organisation refers to the extent to which a group is organised in favour of or against 
crime (Sutherland et al. 1992: 104-105). The present article, therefore, includes the 
perceptions of a group organised to suppress corruption (police officers from the 
Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (CORC), the Flemish districts of the 
federal judicial police (FJP) and local police forces (LPs). 
There is, as well as this theoretical interest, social relevance to our research. A 
minimalistic view of democratic policing refers to the principle that the police have to 
act to enforce the law (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). The criminal law, however, is 
supposed to evolve in relation to changing economic and societal conditions. The 
present study indicates possible gaps between societal perceptions of corruption and the 
forms of corruption prohibited by the law. A contemporary example for Belgium is the 
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practice of dual mandates, in which politicians and public officials simultaneously hold 
more than one position – such as a federal politicians who also acts as the 
(unremunerated) chairman of a private company. Although this is not an offence today, 
a dual mandate evokes a sense of injustice, and a significant group of people call it 
corrupt. Secondly, police resources are less available to investigate corruption when 
corruption is not acknowledged as a priority.1 Consequently, it is possible that some 
forms of corruption are under-investigated even though they are perceived as corrupt by 
some groups in society. Thirdly, corruption is a hidden crime so that the parties 
involved are almost the only source for reports on potential cases. From this 
perspective, it is important to understand the degree of social disapproval of potentially 
corrupt behaviour, and whether some groups in society are more tolerant of particular 
forms of corruption. We can assume that tolerant groups will not react against corrupt 
behaviour. 
This article is structured as follows. The first section addresses the theoretical 
concepts of differential association and differential social organisation in relation to the 
study of perceptions of corruption. Our research design and methodology is reported on 
in relation to this theoretical framework, and our principal findings are discussed in the 
final section. 
Differential association and the concept of corruption 
Sutherland’s differential association theory is based upon the assumption that 
deviance occurs when people define a certain human situation as an appropriate 
                                                
1 Corruption is not a priority in Belgian policy, either in the Belgian Coalition Agreement (December 2011) or in the 
National Security Plan of the Belgian Police 2012-2015 (available from: www.polfedfedpol.be/pub/ 
pdf/NVP2012-2015.pdf). This leads to a lack of resources in the fight against corruption and a serious 
understaffing of the CORC (European Commission 2014). 
Page 3 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gpas
Policing & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
4 
 
occasion for violating social norms or criminal laws. Sutherland stated that modern 
industrial society is segmented into groups that are in conflict over the definition of 
appropriate behaviour. Besides this normative conflict, the differential association 
theory uses two other concepts – differential association process and differential social 
organisation – to explain differences in deviance between individuals and groups 
(Sutherland et al. 1992; Matsueda 2006). 
Perceptions of corruption and the process of differential association 
According to Sutherland, ‘learning’ of deviant behaviour includes two elements: 
skills and definitions (Sutherland et al. 1992). Skills means the requisite skills and 
techniques needed to commit a crime. Depending on their access to ‘resources’ and 
networks, people explore different opportunities and apply different skills. These 
‘opportunities’, Sutherland argues, will result in different learning structures (Cloward 
1959). Petty influence, for instance, is an example often referred to as an instrument 
used by the ‘under-privileged’ to achieve their goals (de Sousa 2008). Della Porta and 
Mény (1997) considered a different form of corruption, generally referred to as ‘grand 
corruption’, or the notion of corruption as an exchange between the elites of the political 
or administrative spheres and those of the economic and social markets. Respondents 
who do not have access to particular opportunities and/or have not learned to apply 
accepted and proper skills will be less tolerant of such behaviour. The second element, 
definitions, refers to the favourable and unfavourable definitions of crime – the motives, 
verbalisations and rationalisations that make crime more justified or acceptable 
(Sutherland et al. 1992). Groups that are assimilated and socialised within a tolerant 
environment, therefore, have a wide range of alternative definitions of corruption. 
Whenever a corrupt practice is accepted as a way of doing business, it will probably not 
be defined as corrupt. Jacobsson (2012), for example, ascertained that people suspected 
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of white-collar criminality refer to their prevailing business culture and use other labels 
for bribery. Zaloznaya (2012) observed that students, parents and professors learned 
favourable definitions of corruption once they entered the Ukrainian university system. 
This learning of criminality, which takes place via communication and experience 
within networks, influences the choice by members of the network of one definition 
over other potential definitions, rather than influencing members’ instrumental 
considerations and moral beliefs about corruption. In other words, criminals acquire 
definitions that legitimise certain forms of deviant behaviour. 
Perceptions of corruption and differential social organisation 
A second and less frequently cited concept of Sutherland’s theory is the concept 
of differential social organisation. This concept provides an organisational explanation 
of how normative conflict in society translates into specific group rates of crime 
(Matsueda 2006). According to Sutherland’s theoretical model, two distinct 
organisations exist: those organised against crime and those organised in favour of 
crime. Sutherland hypothesised that the relative strength of these two kinds of 
organisation could explain the crime rate of groups (Sutherland et al. 1992). The 
concept of differential social organisation implies that people will be exposed to various 
competing definitions of corruption and will learn different skills depending on their 
particular group membership. Since we are studying the process of differential social 
organisation, we introduce to our study a group organised to perform the function of 
suppressing criminality. Police officers are supposed to disapprove of deviant behaviour 
and to be exposed to negative definitions of crime. Accordingly, police officers – as 
members of a group organised against corruption – can be supposed to be less tolerant 
when making judgements about corrupt situations. 
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An interesting question remains, however, relating to the extent to which the 
process of differential social organisation is ‘offence specific’ or ‘offence general’ 
(Jackson et al. 1986; Matsueda 1988). To state this differently, are the police (as a 
group organised against criminality) less tolerant of corruption than they are of other 
crimes? Or do specific units encounter specific processes of differential organisation? 
This question is studied by including police respondents with a different specialisation 
in our sample. A distinction has been made between CORC police officers, FJP officers 
and LPs. The core task of the CORC is to investigate complex and serious cases of 
corruption and related offences like misappropriation of public funds or conflicts of 
interest. In order to conduct its complex investigations, this office recruits specialists 
with a very high level of expertise. After the CORC, the 27 districts of the federal 
judicial police are concerned with criminal behaviour that threatens the democratic 
nature of the state, such as organised crime, corruption, trafficking in human beings, 
fiscal fraud and terrorism. The local judicial police are in many cases concerned with 
local crimes and crimes with individual victims such as theft or acts of violence 
(Ponsaers et al. 2010). In line with the principles of the process of differential social 
organisation we would expect that CORC officers will be less tolerant of corruption 
than other officers because they are more intensively exposed to negative definitions of 
corruption. 
The theoretical framework outlined above informs the general theoretical basis 
of this article. Tolerance towards corruption is learned through interactions within 
networks of like-minded individuals – what Sutherland referred to as differential 
association. Because of the interrelation between differential association and differential 
social organisation (Sutherland et al. 1992: 90), groups organised against corruption 
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will present an abundance of favourable corruption definitions. This hypothesis is 
translated into the following research questions: 
RQ1: Are police officers less tolerant of corruption than other occupational 
status groups? 
RQ2: Do specialised anti-corruption officers have different perceptions of 
corruption from other investigative officers? 
Methodology and research design 
The first phase of the study consisted of a population survey. The field work was 
conducted by a professional firm specializing in population surveys. During the second 
phase, different police departments were surveyed between February and December 
2012 using a paper-and-pencil method. 
A simple random sampling was used for the population survey. In the sampling, 
the directory of the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunication 
(B.I.P.T) was used. A limitation should be mentioned here, however, since the B.I.P.T. 
only records households with a landline and/or a mobile phone number. A minority of 
1% of Flemish citizens, mainly elderly and less educated people, do not make use of 
either a mobile or a landline telephone (Pickery 2010). Before sending out the 
questionnaires, the respondents were contacted by telephone. These telephone calls 
created a threshold-lowering effect by producing some ‘goodwill’ in the people who 
were contacted (Fox et al. 1988). In order to ensure that the sample was representative, 
the contacts took place outside office hours (between 4pm and 8pm). 2,256 
questionnaires were sent out in three waves in the period from February to May 2011. A 
total of 607 valid surveys was obtained, a 26.9% response rate. Elderly people were 
slightly overrepresented in the response group, while poorly educated people were 
underrepresented. The response sample consisted of 18.9% less well-educated people, 
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38% people with a medium level of education and 42.8% of well-educated persons 
whereas the percentages in Belgium are, respectively, 37.43%, 25.31% and 37.27%.2 
Another key variable for this study is employment. The response sample, with 1.6% 
unemployed respondents, 37.3% inactive people and 61.1% employed people, is similar 
to the 2012 official employment statistics: 5.09%, 33.06% and 61.85%.3 The sample 
was weighted using three variables, gender, age and county, although those with a 
medium and high level of education were slightly overrepresented. 
To test the influence of differential social organisation, we included a 
comprehensive sample of police officers in our study. Federal (CORC and FJP) as well 
as local police officers took part in the present study to reflect the Belgian integrated 
police service that has a federal level and a local level. 34 of the 57 police investigators 
working at the CORC in February 2012 filled in a questionnaire. In the period between 
September and December 2012, all 14 Flemish FJP districts were contacted. 190 
questionnaires from 13 FJP districts were received. During the last phase, we invited 27 
local police forces (LPs) to participate in the research. Local police forces are 
categorized into five groups based on the urbanization of their area, and vary from a 
metropolitan police force to forces operating in rural areas. Stratified sampling was 
therefore used, with individual police forces being randomly selected within each 
stratum. 14 of these forces participated and 126 officers from a local police force filled 
in the questionnaire. The response rate by group ranged from 59.65% (N=34) for the 
CORC, 80% (N=190) for the FJP and 50% (N=126) for the LP. 
The core of the questionnaire was a set of 15 items describing potentially corrupt 
situations. These situations were selected on the basis of a qualitative in-depth study of 
                                                
2 Directorate-General Statistics and Economic Information, http://statbel.fgov.be/, consulted on 27/11/2013. 
3 Directorate-General Statistics and Economic Information, http://statbel.fgov.be/, consulted on 27/11/2013. 
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Flemish newspapers. Within each situation we varied the salient characteristics (payoff, 
undue advantage, donor of the payoff, public or private role), resulting in 56 different 
hypothetically corrupt situations (see, for more information, XX 2010). The respondents 
were asked to score the extent to which they judged the situations to be corrupt, using a 
five-point Likert scale (from 1 very corrupt to 5 not corrupt). Afterwards, the individual 
scores were recoded as follows: 1–2 was recoded as corrupt, 3 as neither corrupt nor not 
corrupt and 4–5 as not corrupt. 
In view of the fact that we were studying the influence of occupational 
differential social organisation on the perception of corruption, respondents were asked 
to provide information on their occupational status. A distinction was made between 
actively employed and non-actively employed respondents. Non-active respondents are 
pensioners (including early retirees), the unemployed, those drawing disability benefits 
(including both those who are ill and the disabled), students and homemakers. 
Occupational active respondents are categorised as public servants, those working in the 
private sector and the self-employed. Finally, one question measured the status of the 
occupation. Public officials were divided according to the official Belgian civil service 
scale, from the highest level (A) to the lowest level (D). Private sector workers were 
divided between unskilled workers, skilled workers, lower clerks, middle clerks, senior 
clerks and management. Self-employed persons were divided into small independents 
(for example grocery, shoemaker), farmers/fishermen, contractors, wholesalers and, 
finally, professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants and doctors). The rank ordering of the 
respondents’ occupational status is presented in Table 1.4 Group 1 represents Flemish 
                                                
4 Due to their very tolerant attitudes, students have been treated as a separate group in our sample. 
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citizens with the lowest occupational status, whereas Group 4 represents citizens with 
the highest occupational status. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Results and discussion 
A previous analysis concluded that members of different occupational status 
groups have different perceptions of corruption (XX 2013) and, therefore, it is not 
considered meaningful to compare police officers’ perceptions with those of the general 
public. Instead, the present article focuses on the differences between the occupational 
status groups in the way they perceive corruption. Police officers are here treated as a 
separate occupational status group. 
We observed in 36 scenarios (22 describing potential forms of petty corruption 
and 14 referring to grand corruption) a statistical difference between the distinct 
occupational status groups and the police. The most important differences in the 
perception of corruption between the occupational status groups and the police are 
summarized below. 
1. Low occupational status groups are more tolerant of petty corruption. This is the 
case for 19 of the 22 scenarios describing petty corruption (situations 1-7, 22, 24-26 and 
29-36)5. Situations 8, 9 and 23 are exceptions to this trend. 
2. High occupational status groups are more tolerant of grand corruption. This is 
the case for 9 of the 14 scenarios describing situations of grand corruption (situations 
10-16 and 18-19). Exceptions are situations 20, 21, 27 and 28. Situation 17 is perceived 
                                                
5 Each situation is followed by a reference number that corresponds with the order of appearance in the cross table.  
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as corrupt by almost all respondents, and the differences between the occupational 
status groups are therefore small. 
3. Police officers are the least tolerant group. 25 out of the 36 scenarios are 
perceived as more corrupt by police officers (situations 2-4, 6, 8-9, 11-12, 17, 20-27 and 
29-36).  
4. Police officers tend to be more tolerant of grand corruption. 7 situations of grand 
corruption are judged to be more corrupt by low occupational status groups than by 
police respondents (situations 10, 13-16, 18-19 and 28). This trend is not observed for 
petty corruption. 
5. Police officers are, however, divided in their perception of corruption. 
Specialised anti-corruption officers are less tolerant of corruption. 14 of the 56 scenarios 
are perceived to be more corrupt by the CORC officers than by the other police officers 
(situations 37-40 and 42-47).  
6. CORC officers tend be more selective in their perceptions of corruption. Four of 
the 14 situations are judged to be less corrupt by the CORC officers (situations 41, 48-
50). A possible explanation for this observation is that the actions that are described are 
not corrupt from a criminal law perspective. 
In what follows we will discuss the results mentioned above in more detail. The 
first part will analyse the difference between the police and the different occupational 
status groups. The second part will address the extent to which police officers are 
divided in their perception of corruption.  
Differential social organisation: police versus occupational status groups 
 
41 of the 56 (73.21%) situations in the questionnaire were scored significantly 
differently by police officers and respondents from the different occupational status 
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groups.6 Police officers are generally more severe in judging potentially corrupt 
situations; this is in line with the theoretical expectations arising from Sutherland’s 
concept of differential social organisation. Further, the results show that respondents 
with a low occupational status are more tolerant of petty corruption, whereas a higher 
occupational status seems to result in tolerance of grand corruption. In addition, the 
introduction of the concept of differential social organisation accentuates the following 
as an issue to be considered: respondents with a high occupational status and police 
officers tend to share more perceptions of corruption. Those with a lower occupational 
status seem to show more differentiation from the police in how they perceive 
corruption.7 This gap seems to accord with the division between petty and grand 
corruption. 
 
The influence of differential social organisation 
The process of differential social organisation tends to make police officers the 
least tolerant of corruption. Respondents in this category perceive more situations to be 
corrupt. The first group of scenarios might be characterized as forms of grand 
corruption. This is the case for the scenario (No 11) in which a mayor is invited to a 
building company’s head office in Italy at the company’s expense in order to convince 
him to award a building contract (χ2 = 30.36; df = 10; N = 906; p = 0.001), or that in 
which the mayor takes part in cultural visits in Italy (No 12) (χ2 = 20.29; df = 10; N = 
908; p < 0.05). In another situation (No 35), a contractor who regularly executes large 
contracts for the city deposits 1,000 euros in the bank account of a political party in 
                                                
6 Five situations were omitted from the Chi-square analysis because too many cells had an expected count of less than 
5. 
7 See the Appendix for the cross table with individual scores on the items. 
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order to sponsor the election brochures of an alderman (χ2 = 36.21; df = 10; N = 907; p 
< 0.001). The same is true for the situation (No 36) in which that contractor pays an 
invoice amounting to 1,000 euros for the election brochures of an alderman (χ
2
 = 92.86; 
df = 10; N = 908; p < 0.001).  
A different form of the misuse of a public position is the scenario (No 22) in 
which an alderman, after purchasing computers for the city, gets a discount from the 
dealer for a computer for his daughter, without having to request that discount (χ2 = 
42.04; df = 10; N = 903; p < 0.001). The difference between police respondents and the 
other status groups is even higher if the alderman asks for a discount and this leads to 
the purchase of computers for the city (No 23) (χ2 = 34.49; df = 10; N = 903; p < 0.001), 
or if he asks for the discount afterwards (No 24) (χ2 = 78.91; df = 10; N = 900; p < 
0.001). 
The following situations contain different forms of petty corruption which are 
perceived as more corrupt by police. A public official receives tickets for a football 
match from a company (No 2) (χ2 = 35.72; df = 10; N = 904; p < 0.001). A manager 
working for a private company asks for football tickets (No 4) (χ2 = 59.80; df = 10; N = 
902; p < 0.001), or receives business-class football tickets (No 3) (χ2 =26.11; df = 10; N 
= 903; p < 0.01). 
Also, the situation (No 32) in which an export company proposes that a customs 
official takes more shoes than necessary for the verification of the transport so that the 
company might receive export documents more quickly (χ2 = 47.01; df = 10; N = 907; p 
< 0.001), and that (No 33) in which a company proposes to take more shoes because of 
fear that their export documents will be delayed (χ
2
 = 51.54; df = 10; N = 907; p < 
0.001), are judged to be more corrupt by police officers. The same result is observed for 
a VAT collector who advises a restaurant owner to file for bankruptcy so that he does 
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not have to settle his debts (No 8) (χ2 = 54.64; df = 10; N = 906; p < 0.001), and for a 
VAT collector who does not do everything it takes to collect a VAT debt of 500,000 
euros, so less VAT is paid (No 9) (χ
2
 = 22.36; df = 10; N = 906; p < 0.05). A tax official 
who provides, in return for payment, advice to friends so that they can submit the best 
possible tax return in his district (No 25) (χ2 = 38.35; df = 10; N = 906; p < 0.001), or 
one who completes the tax return in return for payment (No 26) (χ2 = 31.42; df = 10; N 
= 907; p < 0.01) are judged in a comparable way. The same goes for an environmental 
inspector receives a discount on his private purchases after he just gives a warning to a 
supermarket that has opened its doors without an environmental licence (No 29) (χ2 = 
23.79; df = 10; N = 902; p < 0.01). 
Police officers are also more harsh in judging situations which are perceived as 
less corrupt, such as the case (No 6) of an airbag supplier who rewards a factory 
employee with a holiday after an improvement to the production process results in 
increased productivity (χ2 = 34.89; df = 10; N = 908; p < 0.001), or the case (No 20) of 
a pharmaceutical company which, when launching a new medicine, offers a doctors’ 
association a free information session and dinner (χ2 = 24.26; df = 10; N = 903; p < 
0.01).  
Surprisingly, the police respondents were the most tolerant group in judging two 
situations describing a potential situation of grand corruption. This was the case for a 
Member of Parliament (MP) who provides his contact list to his daughter without 
charge. She works for a real estate company and benefits from these contacts by 
securing more real estate contracts (No 16) (χ2 = 27.36; df = 10; N = 869; p < 0.01). A 
similar result is observed for the situation (No 19) of a mayor who visits the offices of a 
political associate to discuss a case to accelerate the construction of a golf course (χ2 = 
23.94; df = 10; N = 873; p < 0.05). 
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Petty corruption perceived to be more corrupt by high occupational status 
respondents and police 
Respondents with a low occupational status are more tolerant of forms of petty 
crime. This was the shown in the response to the case (No 1) of a public servant who 
asks for business-class football tickets from companies who want to receive service 
contracts (χ2 = 51.06; df = 10; N = 903; p < 0.001). The situation (No 30) in which a 
customs official takes more shoes than are required for verification, while being aware 
that the export company will quietly agree out of fear that its export documents will be 
delayed (χ2 = 38,44; df = 10; N = 909; p < 0.001), and the situation (No 31) in which a 
customs official simply takes more shoes than are required to verify the transport 
licence results (χ2 = 50.76; df = 10; N = 910; p < 0.001), are judged to be more corrupt 
by those of high occupational status and the police respondents. A similar judgement is 
made for the situation (No 7) describing a VAT collector who postpones the collection 
of a 500,000 euro VAT debt (χ2 = 35.09; df = 10; N = 908; p < 0.001). Finally, those in 
low occupational status groups are less convinced that a consultant at an administrative 
office responsible for the follow-up of building permits who is able to rent a luxurious 
flat for himself (No 27) (χ
2
 = 57.59; df = 10; N = 907; p < 0.001) or for his sister (No 
28) (χ2 = 20.49; df = 10; N = 907; p < 0.05) at a reduced price is corrupt. Low 
occupational status respondents are also more tolerant of a supplier of airbags donating 
a holiday to the person responsible for the maintenance of a production line who intends 
to improve the production process and thereby ensure a higher rate of productivity (No 
5) (χ
2
 = 32.03; df = 10; N = 904; p < 0.001). 
 
Page 15 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gpas
Policing & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
16 
 
Grand corruption perceived to be more corrupt by low occupational status 
groups 
Members of the lower status groups, on the other hand, are more likely to judge 
behaviour that originates from collusion between political and economic networks to be 
corrupt. Higher occupational status groups tend to be more tolerant of these forms of 
corruption. 
The situation (No 13) in which a lawyer solicits secretaries at ministerial offices 
for securing more cases is judged to be corrupt by more members of the low status and 
unemployed groups than by police officers or members of the high status group (χ2 = 
36.80; df = 10; N = 906; p < 0.001). An even more pronounced difference is observed in 
the case (No 14) where the lawyer’s overview is sent to the office of his political party 
(χ2 = 36.11; df = 10; N = 905; p < 0.001). Even the situation (No 15) in which the 
lawyer is described as being a friend of the minister is judged to be more corrupt by 
members of lower occupational status groups (χ2 = 31.93; df = 10; N = 907; p < 0.001). 
Police officers and low occupational status respondents are more severe in their 
judgement in the following two situations. A mayor is invited to the Brussels office of a 
construction company to convince him to award a building contract to the company (No 
10) (χ
2
 = 21.66; df = 10; N = 901; p < 0.05). Low occupational status respondents are, 
together with police officers, almost unanimous that an MP selling his contacts to 
entrepreneurs for 10,000 euros so that they could secure real estate contracts (No 17) is 
corrupt (χ2 = 20.09; df = 10; N = 904; p < 0.05). Respondents with a higher 
occupational status were more tolerant in this case. 
Finally, there are two exceptions within this group of situations. The first is the 
case (No 34) of a contractor who deposits 1,000 euros in the personal bank account of 
the alderman of public works to sponsor his election brochure (χ2 = 36.53; df = 10; N = 
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907; p < 0.001), and the second (No 21) that of a pharmaceutical company that offers a 
doctors’ association a free information session on the island of Mallorca (χ2 = 19.24; df 
= 10; N = 902; p < 0.05). Both are situations that might be characterised as grand 
corruption, and both are judged to be more corrupt by police officers and members of 
high occupational status groups. 
Perceptions of specialised anti-corruption officers compared with those of other 
police officers 
The variation is higher between the different occupational status groups and the 
police. Nevertheless, it appears that the difference between the distinct police groups is 
substantial.  
The results clearly show that CORC officers are harsher in judging potentially 
corrupt situations than local police officers and officers from the federal judicial police. 
This is the case in the situation of the mayor who is invited to the Brussels offices of a 
construction company in order to convince him to award the company a building 
contract (No 37) (χ2 = 9.94; df = 2; N = 351; p < 0.01). Local police officers and FJP 
officers are also less convinced that a local company purchasing entrance tickets for the 
mayor’s ball for a total amount of 1,000 euros is corrupt (No 38) (χ2 = 7.75; df = 2; N = 
351; p < 0.05), and the same is true when this company is located in another city (No 
39) (χ2 = 12.08; df = 2; N = 351; p < 0.01) or in Germany (No 40) (χ2 = 9.19; df = 2; N 
= 351; p = 0.01). The difference between the police groups is the highest for the case in 
which a lawyer uses the political network of his wife, who is a minister, to get more 
cases (No 45) (χ2 = 9.95; df = 2; N = 351; p < 0.01), and for the case in which a tax 
official provides, in return for payment, advice to friends so that they can submit the 
best possible tax return in his district (No 46) (χ2 = 10.53; df = 2; N = 350; p < 0.01). If 
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the official completes the tax return, in return for payment, this is judged in a fairly 
equal way (No 47) (χ2 = 10.66; df = 2; N = 350; p < 0.01). 
The following situations describing potential situations of private corruption are 
judged more severely by CORC respondents: an airbag supplier rewards a factory 
employee with a holiday after the employee improves the production process and causes 
increased productivity (No 42) (χ2 = 6.96; df = 2; N = 351; p < 0.05); and a manager 
receives business-class football tickets from companies looking to secure contracts for 
maintenance work from the manager’s company (No 43) (χ
2
 = 6.61; df = 2; N = 351; p 
< 0.05).  
CORC officers are more severe but are also more selective in judging potentially 
corrupt situations. The following four situations stand out in this respect, because non-
specialised police officers perceive them as more corrupt than do CORC officers. A 
customs official who takes more shoes than are required to verify the transport licence 
is perceived to be more corrupt by judicial police officers and local police (No 48) (χ2 = 
9.83; df = 4; N = 351; p < 0.01). A mayor who visits the offices of a political associate 
to discuss a case to accelerate the construction of an industrial site (No 49) is generally 
not judged to be very corrupt, but considerably more judicial officers than CORC 
officers view this behaviour as corrupt (χ
2
 = 8,29, df = 2; N = 350; p < 0.05). A similar 
outcome is observed in the case where the mayor discusses the creation of a golf course 
(No 50) (χ2 = 8.87; df = 2; N = 350; p < 0.05). The situation of the consultant at an 
administrative office responsible for the follow-up of building permits who lives for 
free in a luxurious flat is judged in a similar way (No 41) (χ2 = 9.46; df = 2; N = 347; p 
< 0.01) 
Local police officers judged these types of behaviour to be more corrupt than did 
CORC officers. Local police officers were also most severe in judging the situation of a 
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MP who provides his contacts to his daughter free of charge (No 44) (χ2 = 9.09; df = 2; 
N = 348; p < 0.05). 
Discussion 
Our study on perceptions of corruption yields several findings. Although the 
data used in this article are drawn from a random sample of Flemish Belgian citizens – a 
sample that is presumably not disproportionately involved in corrupt behaviour – and 
police respondents, we observed significant differences in the respondents’ judgements 
on scenarios that described potentially corrupt situations. Depending on their 
occupational status, people tend to incorporate different verbalisations and 
rationalisations for corruption. Members of the low occupational status group feel that 
petty corruption is more justified. One of these cases is a public official asking for 
football tickets (No 1). This act is perceived as corrupt by 93.8% of respondents with a 
high occupational status, which is much more than the 69.9% of the members of the low 
occupational status group. A similar ratio is observed for the case of avoiding a VAT 
debt (No 7) or getting a holiday for ensuring that the production process is improved 
(No 5). Respondents with a high occupational status are more accepting of grand forms 
of corruption. A majority of 62.5% of the lowest occupational status group calls a 
lawyer who for personal reasons abuses the privilege of his friend being a minister 
corrupt (No 15). Respondents with a high occupational status are considerably more 
tolerant: a minority of 43.8% calls this situation corrupt.  
In essence, the scenario-based questionnaire which is used in the present study 
measures varying public definitions of corruption. Our account is that someone who 
does not perceive behaviour as corrupt will not define as such. These definitions play an 
important role in the initiation of deviant behaviour (Matsueda 2006: 5). There are a 
large number of studies describing how these verbalisations, as part of a neutralisation 
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technique, precede and enable deviant behaviour (Sykes and Matza 1957; Coleman 
1987; Bandura et al. 1996; Anand et al. 2005; Topalli 2005). Other papers have 
explored the idea that moral disengagement mechanisms facilitate non-compliance and 
pave the way to corruption (Moore 2008; Huisman and Vande Walle 2010; Vande 
Walle and Dormaels 2010). Moral disengagement should be understood as people’s 
ability to ‘rationalise’ deviant behaviour in such a way that it appears to be less harmful 
(Bandura et al. 1996: 365). Tavits’ (2010) finding that public officials and citizens are 
more likely to engage in corruption when they do not define corruption as ‘wrong’ 
becomes very meaningful in the light of the present research. It is likely that the 
observed tolerance of potentially corrupt situations corresponds to the position that 
corruption is not morally reprehensible. People ignore corrupt behaviour or do not 
perceive a situation to be corrupt. This might possibly explain why corruption has a 
tendency to persist. A study conducted by Ernst and Young (2012) indicated that the 
tolerance of corruption is increasing in Belgium. No less than 34% of the Belgian 
respondents were willing to pay a bribe to help their business survive. This figure is 
very different from the western European average of 11%.  
Another concern relates to the outcome that all occupational status groups turn 
out to be tolerant of situations which correspond to their practice. Employee deviance is 
more constrained by informal social controls present in primary work-group 
relationships than by the more formal reactions to deviance of those in positions of 
authority within the formal organisation (Werner 1983; Kamp and Brooks 2005; Moore 
2008). Corruption stands out as a crime in which all parties have an interest in 
concealing the facts. When corruption becomes the social norm within a occupational 
network, it will be less probable that whistle-blowers will expose corrupt behaviour. 
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A thought-provoking outcome is that respondents who belong to the high status 
group share perceptions that are more comparable to the police respondents. Although 
this is speculative, we believe that respondents within these groups have more personal 
characteristics, such as education or living conditions, in common than they do with 
members of the other groups. These individual factors affect the differential association 
process indirectly by affecting the probability of learning the definitions that are either 
favourable or unfavourable to corruption. Additionally, there might be a more critical 
social explanation. Elites are more likely to translate their interests into legislative 
processes. This regulatory framework, governed by policy priorities, creates a 
fundamental normative context within which the process of differential social 
organisation of police officers operates. 
Other studies have reported that the higher a person’s social status, the more he 
or she will approach corruption from a ‘legalistic’ point of view (Jackson and Smith 
1996; Redlawsk and McCann 2005). Our data suggest, however, that this relationship 
between the law and perceptions of corruption is not so clear cut. If police officers were 
only directed by a legal framework, we might expect that potentially corrupt situations 
are judged by all police officers in a similar way. However, police officers judged the 
situations in different ways – specialised anti-corruption officers are more severe but 
also tend to be more selective in judging situations. The selectiveness became apparent 
in the judgement on a mayor visiting a minister and political associate to discuss a 
construction case (No 49). Only 3.1% of the CORC officers perceived this situation to 
be corrupt, compared to 21.6% of local police officers. Another example is the situation 
of a customs official who takes more shoes than are necessary to carry out a check. 
Over 90% of the police respondents perceived this as corrupt, but only 75% of the 
CORC officers did. A tax official providing advice on how to pay less tax can find less 
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understanding. 90.6 % of the CORC officers judged this to be corrupt; this is 
significantly more than the 62.1% of the local police or 61.3% of the federal judicial 
police officers. Our data tend to indicate that there is a gap between the penal law 
concept of corruption and what is actually perceived as corrupt within society. In itself, 
it is not new to state that the definition given in penal law is not an adequate way to 
delimit corruption. This judicial bias has, however, important consequences for the 
suppression of corruption. According to Turk (1969), police organisations are very 
influential in the initial stages of the registration of offences. Repressive state 
interventions are generally confined to those activities that fall within the criminal law 
definition of corruption. Further research might explore the extent to which police 
officers’ perceptions of corruption correspond to state interventions. Depending on the 
service which receives a complaint – the local police, the judicial police or the COCR – 
the reaction might vary significantly. 
Our data empirically suggest that a vast number of the activities referred to as 
corrupt probably fall outside the penal law definition. Yet these situations are perceived 
as corrupt by citizens and provoke a sense of injustice. This observation was made, for 
example, regarding the situation in which a mayor visits the office of a political 
associate to discuss the construction of a golf course (No 19). The case (No 14) of a 
lawyer who solicits the support of a minister friend in securing more cases is perceived 
as more corrupt by members of low status groups than by the police. A key question is 
the extent to which these situations will provoke a governmental reaction. Police and 
judicial authorities do not perceive them to be corrupt and are confined to the limits of 
law. The absence of an institutional reaction by might feed a suspicion that the 
government and law enforcement agencies are selective in tackling corruption. 
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Future research might also go into the question of whether the varying 
perception between police and occupational status group results in the over-policing of 
petty corruption and the under-policing of grand corruption. Our data confirmed that 
police respondents share more perceptions with high occupational status groups. In the 
interests of public trust, it might be rewarding to place corruption on a continuum so 
that the relationship between ‘illegal’ and ‘unethical’ can be explored. This will result in 
genuine insights and encourage a debate about where state intervention should start and 
the extent to which more informal approaches to preventing corruption might be 
productive. 
Conclusion 
Differential occupational association tends to influence people’s perceptions of 
corruption. The present article shows that the processes of differential association and 
social organisation are interrelated. Although this study does not offer proof nor explain 
how the mechanism of differential association works on an individual level, it is able to 
contribute to our understanding of how normative conflict in society on the meaning of 
corruption translates into specific groups being more tolerant of distinct forms of 
corruption. The present study is innovative in the sense that it analyses the perceptions 
of citizens and police officers in direct comparison. Respondents with a low 
occupational status tend to be more tolerant in considering situations of petty 
corruption, while those of high occupational status have more affinity with grand forms 
of corruption. This provides, therefore, empirical support for an organisational 
explanation of how normative conflict in society translates into specific corruption 
resistance within distinct groups. 
In addition to that, high occupational status respondents and police officers have 
more perceptions of corruption in common. More concretely, it seems that these groups 
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are more tolerant of forms of grand corruption but harsher in judging forms of petty 
corruption. This observation raises the following interesting question: are forms of petty 
corruption more noticed by police than the corruption of elites? Finally, we observed 
surprisingly great differences between specialised anti-corruption police officers and 
police officers from other departments. This suggests that the process of differential 
social organisation is to some extent crime-specific. 
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Table 1: Classification of occupational statuses N (%)  
Group 1: Non-active 
group  
(232; 38,6%) 
Group 2: Low-esteem 
job  
(91; 14,6.%) 
Group 3: Middle-
esteem job  
(114; 18,6%) 
Group 4: High-
esteem job  
(39; 6,3%) 
Unemployed  
14 (2,4%) 
Public official, level 
C/D  
14 (2,3%) 
Public official, level B  
5 (0,7%) 
Public official, level A  
16 (2,7%)  
Pension  
174 (28,8%) 
Unskilled worker  
12 (2,1%) 
Skilled worker  
49 (8,1%) 
Clerk, direction level 
14 (2,2%) 
Incapacitated  
13 (2,2%) 
Low-level clerk  
47 (7,2%) 
Clerk  
57 (9,3%) 
Management/Board  
6 (0,9%) 
Homemakers 31 
(5,2%) 
Small independent  
18 (3,0%) 
Contractor, medium to 
large independent 
3 (0,5%) 
‘Professional’  
3 (0,5%) 
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Appendix Cross tables 
 
Appendix: occupational status and perceptions of corruption 
 
 
 
No  
 Student Low 
occupational 
status – 
unemployed 
Low 
occupational 
status 
employed 
Middle 
occupational 
status 
High 
occupational 
status 
Police 
John is responsible for the maintenance and renovation of the office buildings. Imagine John being a governmental official. 
Do you think it is corrupt for John… 
1 …to ask companies that want to do maintenance work for the government to give him business class football tickets?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
12,9 (8) 
19,4 (12) 
67,7 (42) 
11,7 (35) 
15,1 (45) 
73,2 (219) 
12,3 (9) 
17,8 (13) 
69,9 (51) 
10,5 (9) 
10,5 (9) 
79,1 (68) 
0 (0) 
6,2 (2) 
93,8 (30) 
2,3 (8) 
2,9 (26) 
90,3 (317) 
2 … to receive business class football tickets from companies that want to do maintenance work for the government?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
24,2 (15) 
29,0 (29) 
46,8 (29) 
19,7 (59) 
22,7 (68) 
57,7 (173) 
24,7 (18) 
17,8 (13) 
57,5 (42) 
18,6 (16) 
30,2 (26) 
51,2 (44) 
6,2 (2) 
37,5 (12) 
56,2 (18) 
11,4 (40) 
17,7 (62) 
70,9 (249) 
  
John is responsible for the maintenance and renovation of the office buildings. Imagine John being a manager at company 
X. Do you think it is corrupt for John to… 
3 …receive business class football tickets from companies that want to do maintenance work for the company he works at?* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
46,8 (29) 
30,6 (19) 
22,6 (14) 
39,1 (117) 
27,1 (81) 
33,8 (101) 
35,6 (26) 
27,4 (20) 
37,0 (27) 
38,4 (33) 
32,6 (28) 
29,1 (25) 
31,2 (10) 
43,8 (14) 
25,0 (8) 
27,6 (97) 
27,6 (97) 
44,7 (157) 
4 …ask companies that want to do maintenance work for the company he works at to give him business class football 
tickets?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
29,0 (18) 
11,3 (7) 
59,7 (37) 
20,7 (62) 
21,4 (64) 
57,9 (173) 
16,4 (12) 
26,0 (19) 
57,5 (42) 
16,3 (14) 
20,9 (18) 
62,8 (54) 
6,2 (2) 
21,9 (7) 
71,9 (23) 
5,4 (19) 
15,7 (55) 
78,9 (276) 
Bart is an engineer and is responsible for the maintenance of a production line in a car factory. Do you think it is corrupt 
that a supplier of airbags… 
5 …gives Bart a holiday to make sure he will improve the production process so it would result in a higher airbag 
productivity?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
22,6 (14) 
21,0 (13) 
56,5 (35) 
19,6 (59) 
19,6 (59) 
60,8 (183) 
13,7 (10) 
13,7 (10) 
72,6 (53) 
11,5 (10) 
21,8 (19) 
66,7 (58) 
6,2 (2) 
9,4 (3) 
84,4 (27) 
10,3 (36) 
12,6 (44) 
77,1 (269) 
6 …rewards Bart with a holiday after Bart has improved the production process resulting in a higher airbag 
productivity?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
80,6 (50) 
12,9 (8) 
6,5 (4) 
55,8 (169) 
15,2 (46) 
29,0 (88) 
57,5 (42) 
17,8 (13) 
24,7 (18) 
51,7 (45) 
18,4 (16) 
29,9 (26) 
46,9 (15) 
31,2 (10) 
21,9 (7) 
45,6 (160) 
21,1 (74) 
33,3 (117) 
A restaurant has a VAT debt of 500,000 euro. VAT collector Emma is a loyal customer at the restaurant. Do you think it is 
corrupt that… 
7 …Emma postpones the collection of the VAT debt?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
17,7 (11) 
30,6 (19) 
51,6 (32) 
11,6 (35) 
15,2 (46) 
73,3 (222) 
9,6 (7) 
20,5 (15) 
69,9 (51) 
8,0 (7) 
16,1 (14) 
75,9 (66) 
15,6 (5) 
0 (0) 
84,4 (27) 
6,3 (22) 
12,8 (45) 
80,9 (284) 
8 …Emma advises the restaurant owner to go bankrupt so he does not have to settle his debts?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
12,9 (8) 
27,4 (17) 
59,7 (37) 
7,3 (22) 
6,0 (18) 
86,7 (261) 
11,0 (8) 
17,8 (13) 
71,2 (52) 
8,0 (7) 
16,1 (14) 
75,9 (66) 
6,2 (2) 
18,8 (6) 
75,0 (24) 
4,0 (14) 
6,8 (24) 
89,2 (313) 
9 …Emma does not everything it takes to collect the VAT debt, so less VAT is paid?* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
8,1 (5) 
21,0 (13) 
71,0 (44) 
7,0 (21) 
9,0 (27) 
84,1 (253) 
6,8 (5) 
9,6 (7) 
83,6 (61) 
5,7 (5) 
12,6 (11) 
81,6 (71) 
9,4 (3) 
6,2 (2) 
84,4 (27) 
2,6 (9) 
7,7 (27) 
89,7 (315) 
A building company is one of the candidates to renovate police offices. The company can earn 500,000 with this assignment 
and tries to convince the mayor to award the contract to the company. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
10 …the mayor is invited to the Brussels establishment of the building company?* 
 not corrupt 85,2 (52) 57,9 (173) 53,4 (39) 60,0 (51) 62,5 (20) 60,4 (212) 
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neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
9,8 (6) 
4,9 (3) 
21,4 (64) 
20,7 (62) 
23,3 (17) 
23,3 (17) 
18,8 (16) 
21,2 (18) 
28,1 (9) 
9,4 (3) 
21,7 (76) 
17,9 (63) 
11 …that the mayor visits the head office in Italy, at the expenses of the building company?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
25,8 (16) 
21,0 (13) 
53,2 (33) 
19,9 (60) 
14,9 (45) 
65,2 (197) 
13,7 (10) 
21,9 (16) 
64,4 (47) 
18,6 (16) 
23,3 (20) 
58,1 (50) 
15,5 (5) 
15,6 (5) 
68,8 (22) 
10,8 (38) 
12,0 (42) 
77,2 (271) 
12 …that the mayor visits the head office in Italy and combines that with a number of cultural visits, all at the expenses of the 
building company?** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
6,5 (4) 
14,5 (9) 
79,0 (49) 
7,2 (22) 
6,9 (21) 
85,9 (261) 
6,8 (5) 
4,1 (3) 
89,0 (65) 
9,3 (8) 
8,1 (7) 
82,6 (71) 
6,2 (2) 
12,5 (4) 
81,2 (26) 
4,0 (14) 
3,7 (13) 
92,3 (324) 
A lawyer tries to get as many public contracts as possible. Therefore he makes a survey of the assignments he already got 
and the assignments he would like to get and sends it to some of his contacts. Do you think it is corrupt that the lawyer sends 
this survey to… 
13 …the secretariats of minister offices to apply for support to get more assignments?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
72,1 (44) 
23,0 (3) 
4,9 (3) 
50,2 (152) 
23,4 (71) 
26,4 (80) 
56,9 (41) 
23,6 (17) 
19,4 (14) 
41,4 (36) 
40,2 (35) 
18,4 (16) 
75,0 (24) 
6,2 (2) 
18,8 (6) 
55,0 (193) 
27,1 (95) 
17,9 (63) 
14 …the political party he is a member of in order to get more assignments that way?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
60,7 (37) 
26,2 (16) 
13,1 (8) 
35,4 (107) 
22,5 (68) 
42,1 (127) 
51,4 (37) 
22,2 (16) 
26,4 (19) 
37,9 (33) 
34,5 (30) 
27,6 (24) 
59,4 (19) 
15,6 (5) 
25,0 (8) 
44,2 (155) 
25,9 (91) 
29,9 (105) 
15 …a minster friend to get more assignments?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
31,1 (19) 
27,9 (17) 
41,0 (25) 
20,7 (63) 
16,8 (51) 
62,5 (190) 
33,3 (24) 
33,3 (24) 
33,3 (24) 
21,8 (19) 
27,6 (24) 
50,6 (44) 
37,5 (12) 
18,8 (6) 
43,8 (14) 
27,6 (97) 
23,1 (81) 
49,3 (173) 
An MP has very good contacts in the real estate market. Do you think it is corrupt that this MP… 
16 …gives his contacts to his daughter who works for a real estate agency. Doing so, she can acquire more real estate 
contracts.** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
51,6 (32) 
29,0 (18) 
19,4 (12) 
26,8 (81) 
24,2 (73) 
49,0 (148) 
30,1 (22) 
31,5 (23) 
38,4 (28) 
30,2 (26) 
24,4 (21) 
45,3 (39) 
34,4 (11) 
15,6 (5) 
50,0 (16) 
35,1 (122) 
26,4 (92) 
38,5 (134) 
17 …sells his contacts to fellow entrepreneurs for 10.000 euro. Doing so these entrepreneurs can acquire real estate 
contracts.* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
1,6 (1) 
9,7 (6) 
88,7 (55) 
3,6 (11) 
1,3 (3,6) 
95,0 (288) 
4,1 (3) 
5,5 (4) 
90,4 (66) 
2,3 (2) 
8,1 (7) 
89,5 (77) 
0,0 (0) 
9,4 (3) 
90,6 (29) 
2,6 (9) 
3,4 (12) 
94,0 (327) 
A mayor visits the ministry office of a political associate to promote the finalization of a building file. Do you think it is 
corrupt that the mayor discusses a file to accelerate the construction… 
18 …of a home for elderly his municipality?* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
80,3 (49) 
14,8 (9) 
4,9 (3) 
85,2 (260) 
9,5 (29) 
5,2 (16) 
69,9 (51) 
17,8 (13) 
12,3 (9) 
77,0 (67) 
19,5 (17) 
3,4 (3) 
81,2 (26) 
12,5 (4) 
6,2 (2) 
74,9 (262) 
17,1 (60) 
8,0 (28) 
19 …of a golf course in his municipality?* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
45,0 (27) 
25,0 (18) 
30,0 (18) 
54,4 (166) 
21,0 (64) 
24,6 (75) 
49,3 (36) 
21,9 (16) 
28,8 (21) 
55,2 (48) 
20,7 (18) 
24,1 (21) 
56,2 (18) 
28,1 (9) 
15,6 (5) 
65,1 (228) 
20,0 (70) 
14,9 (52) 
A doctor’s association organises an informative day on the application of a new medicine. Do you think it is corrupt that the 
pharmaceutical company producing this medicine offers the doctors’ association… 
20 …a Brussels meeting area for free and pays the invoice of the dinner?** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
56,5 (35) 
21,0 (13) 
22,6 (14) 
39,5 (118) 
24,1 (72) 
36,5 (109) 
36,1 (26) 
26,4 (19) 
37,5 (27) 
28,7 (25) 
29,9 (26) 
41,4 (36) 
31,2 (10) 
31,2 (10) 
37,5 (12) 
31,1 (109) 
22,5 (79) 
46,4 (163) 
21 …to organise this informative day on Mallorca, at the expenses of the company?* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
12,9 (8) 
29,0 (18) 
58,1 (36) 
12,7 (38) 
12,7 (38) 
74,7 (224) 
17,8 (13) 
13,7 (10) 
68,5 (50) 
9,3 (8) 
20,9 (18) 
69,8 (60) 
12,5 (4) 
12,5 (4) 
75,0 (24) 
10,0 (35) 
13,2 (46) 
76,8 (268) 
An alderman purchases computers for his city service at a chain store. Do you think it is corrupt that the alderman,… 
22 …after he purchased computers for the city, gets a discount from the chain store for the purchase of a computer for his 
daughter, without him asking?*** 
 not corrupt 43,5 (27) 57,1 (172) 46,6 (34) 50,6 (43) 31,2 (10) 36,0 (126) 
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neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
14,5 (9) 
41,9 (26) 
16,3 (49) 
26,6 (80) 
17,8 (13) 
35,6 (26) 
24,7 (21) 
24,7 (21) 
34,4 (11) 
34,4 (11) 
20,6 (72) 
43,4 (152) 
23 Do you think it is corrupt that an alderman, before he purchases computers for the city, asks for a discount for the purchase 
of a computer for his daughter?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
25,8 (16) 
19,4 (12) 
54,8 (34) 
28,7 (87) 
16,5 (50) 
54,8 (166) 
23,6 (17) 
11,1 (8) 
65,3 (47) 
29,4 (25) 
17,6 (15) 
52,9 (45) 
31,2 (10) 
15,6 (5) 
53,1 (17) 
14,3 (50) 
12,3 (43) 
73,4 (256) 
24 …after he purchased computers for the city, asks the chain store to get a discount for the purchase of a computer for his 
daughter?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
25,8 (16) 
27,4 (17) 
46,8 (29) 
34,4 (103) 
15,7 (47) 
49,8 (149) 
24,7 (18) 
21,9 (16) 
53,4 (39) 
30,6 (26) 
15,3 (13) 
54,1 (46) 
15,6 (5) 
15,6 (5) 
68,8 (22) 
10,3 (36) 
12,6 (44) 
77,1 (269) 
A tax official works on an audit office and treats the tax returns of his district. Do you think it is corrupt that the official… 
25 …provides against payment advice to friends in order to submit the best possible tax return in his district?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
45,2 (28) 
22,6 (14) 
32,3 (20) 
26,7 (81) 
26,7 (81) 
46,5 (141) 
23,3 (17) 
26,0 (19) 
50,7 (37) 
37,2 (32) 
31,4 (27) 
31,4 (27) 
40,6 (13) 
9,4 (3) 
50,0 (16) 
23,4 (82) 
19,1 (67) 
57,4 (201) 
26 …completes the tax return against payment in order to submit the best possible return in his district?** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
21,0 (13) 
25,8 (16) 
53,2 (33) 
23,4 (71) 
22,4 (68) 
54,3 (165) 
22,2 (16) 
13,9 (10) 
63,9 (46) 
36,8 (32) 
26,4 (23) 
36,8 (32) 
37,5 (12) 
12,5 (4) 
50,0 (16) 
18,9 (66) 
16,9 (59) 
64,3 (225) 
John works as a consultant at an office of administration and is responsible for the follow-up of building files executed on 
behalf of the city. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
27 …John rents a luxurious flat at a valuable price, the flat being owned by a real estate agent who executes large building 
assignments for the city?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
27,4 (17) 
21,0 (13) 
51,6 (32) 
15,5 (47) 
26,0 (79) 
58,6 (178) 
9,6 (7) 
19,2 (14) 
71,2 (52) 
13,8 (12) 
23,0 (20) 
63,2 (55) 
3,1 (1) 
15,6 (5) 
81,2 (26) 
6,0 (21) 
13,8 (48) 
80,2 (280) 
28 …John’s sister rents a luxurious flat at a valuable price, owned by a real estate agent who executes large building 
assignments for the city?*  
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
8,1 (5) 
30,6 (19) 
61,3 (38) 
7,6 (23) 
14,2 (43) 
78,1 (236) 
6,8 (5) 
8,2 (6) 
84,9 (62) 
12,6 (11) 
14,9 (13) 
72,4 (63) 
6,2 (2) 
12,5 (4) 
81,2 (26) 
9,4 (33) 
12,3 (43) 
78,3 (275) 
Environmental inspector Tom states that a supermarket has opened its doors without environmental licence. Do you think it 
is corrupt that… 
29 …the owner of the supermarket suggests Tom to give him a discount on his personal purchases? In exchange for that, Tom 
is only to give a warning.* 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
0,0 (0) 
6,5 (4) 
93,5 (58) 
3,3 (11) 
6,3 (19) 
90,0 (270) 
4,1 (3) 
2,7 (2) 
93,2 (68) 
1,2 (1) 
3,5 (3) 
95,3 (82) 
3,1 (1) 
3,1 (1) 
93,8 (30) 
0,9 (3) 
1,1 (4) 
98,0 (342) 
A customs officials checks a cargo of sports shoes that is declared with an international transport. He has doubts whether or 
not the cargo of shoes corresponds to the export licence. Therefore he takes samples out of the cargo to execute a material 
verification of the shoes. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
30 …the customs official takes more shoes than required for the verification, being aware of the fact that the export company 
silently agrees because if not, it fears the export documents won’t arrive in time?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
0,0 (0) 
11,3 (7) 
88,7 (55) 
6,2 (19) 
7,9 (24) 
85,9 (262) 
4,1 (3) 
4,1 (3) 
91,8 (67) 
4,6 (4) 
9,2 (8) 
86,2 (75) 
0,0 (0) 
3,1 (1) 
96,9 (31) 
1,4 (5) 
1,4 (5) 
97,1 (340) 
31 … the customs official simply takes more shoes than required for the verification?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
3,2 (2) 
24,2 (45) 
72,6 (45) 
9,2 (28) 
13,8 (42) 
77,0 (235) 
4,1 (3) 
9,6 (7) 
86,3 (63) 
11,5 (10) 
14,9 (13) 
73,6 (64) 
3,1 (1) 
9,4 (3) 
87,5 (28) 
7,4 (26) 
2,6 (9) 
90,0 (316) 
32 …the export company suggests the customs official to take more shoes than necessary in order to receive the export 
documents much quicker?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
1,6 (1) 
4,8 (3) 
93,5 (58) 
7,5 (23) 
8,5 (26) 
83,9 (256) 
5,5 (4) 
4,1 (3) 
90,4 (66) 
2,4 (2) 
11,8 (10) 
85,9 (73) 
0,0 (0) 
6,2 (2) 
93,8 (30) 
1,1 (4) 
1,4 (5) 
97,4 (341) 
33 … the export company suggests the customs official to take more shoes than necessary because if not, it fears the export 
documents won’t arrive in time?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
1,6 (1) 
6,5 (4) 
91,9 (57) 
6,6 (20) 
11,5 (35) 
81,9 (249) 
4,1 (3) 
6,8 (5) 
89,0 (65) 
5,8 (5) 
11,6 (10) 
82,6 (71) 
0,0 (0) 
6,2 (2) 
93,8 (30) 
1,1 (4) 
1,4 (4) 
97,4 (342) 
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A contractor regularly executes large assignments for a city. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
34 …this contractor deposits 1,000 euro on the personal bank account of the alderman of public works to sponsor his election 
brochure? 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
0,0 (0) 
14,8 (9) 
85,2 (52) 
5,9 (18) 
6,6 (20) 
87,5 (265) 
5,5 (4) 
5,5 (4) 
89,0 (65) 
4,6 (4) 
6,9 (6) 
88,5 (77) 
0,0 (0) 
3,1 (1) 
96,9 (31) 
2,0 (7) 
1,4 (5) 
96,6 (339) 
35 …this contractor deposits 1,000 euro on the bank account of the political party to which the alderman of public works 
belongs, to sponsor the election brochures?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
11,3 (7) 
24,2 (15) 
64,5 (40) 
13,2 (40) 
15,8 (48) 
71,0 (215) 
11,1 (8) 
12,5 (9) 
76,4 (55) 
11,5 (10) 
14,9 (13) 
73,6 (64) 
3,1 (1) 
25,0 (8) 
71,9 (23) 
6,8 (24) 
7,1 (25) 
86,0 (302) 
36 … this contractor sponsors the election brochures of the alderman of public works and pays the invoice amounting to 1,000 
euro?*** 
 not corrupt 
neither corrupt/not 
corrupt 
corrupt 
21,0 (13) 
32,3 (20) 
46,8 (29) 
21,1 (64) 
13,2 (40) 
65,8 (200) 
17,8 (13) 
6,8 (5) 
75,3 (55) 
12,6 (11) 
20,7 (18) 
66,7 (58) 
0,0 (0) 
25,8 (8) 
74,2 (23) 
4,6 (16) 
8,5 (30) 
86,9 (305) 
Chi-square: (*) Differences between membership status-group is significant on the level: p< 0.05*= p<0.01**=p<0.001*** 
 
Table 3: differences in the perception of corruption within the professional status group 
police 
No  LPs CORC FJP 
 A building company is one of the candidates to renovate police offices. The company can earn 500,000 
with this assignment and tries to convince the mayor to award the contract to the company. Do you think 
it is corrupt that… 
37 …the mayor is invited to the Brussels establishment of the building company?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
86,4 (108) 
13,6 (17) 
62,5 (20) 
37,5 (12) 
82,5 (160) 
17,5 (34) 
 Every year, the mayor’s ball is organized. Entrance tickets for the dinner and the ball cost 50 euro. Do 
you think it is corrupt… 
38 …that a local company purchases entrance tickets for the mayor’s ball for a total amount of 1,000 euro?* 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
82,4 (103) 
17,6 (22) 
62,5 (20) 
37,5 (12) 
83,0 (161) 
17,0 (33) 
39 …that a company located in another city purchase entrance tickets for the mayor’s ball for a total amount of 
1,000 euro?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
80,8 (101) 
19,2 (24) 
53,1 (17) 
46,9 (15) 
79,4 (154) 
20,6 (40) 
40 …that a company in Germany purchases entrance tickets for the mayor’s ball for a total amount of 1,000 
euro?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
73,6 (92) 
26,4 (33) 
46,9 (15) 
53,1 (17) 
71,6 (139) 
28,4 (55) 
 John works as a consultant at an office of administration and is responsible for the follow-up of building 
files executed on behalf of the city. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
41 …John lives in a luxurious flat for free, the flat being owned by a real estate agent who executes large building 
assignments for the city?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
4,1 (5) 
95,9 (118) 
6,2 (2) 
93,8 (30) 
0,0 (0) 
100,0 (192) 
 Bart is an engineer and is responsible for the maintenance of a production line in a car factory. Do you 
think it is corrupt that a supplier of airbags… 
42 …rewards Bart with a holiday after Bart has improved the production process resulting in a higher airbag 
productivity?* 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
73,6 (92) 
26,4 (33) 
50,0 (16) 
50,0 (16) 
64,9 (126) 
35,1 (68) 
 John is responsible for the maintenance and renovation of the office buildings. Imagine John being a 
manager at company X. Do you think it is corrupt for John to… 
43 …receive business class football tickets from companies that want to do maintenance work for the company he 
works at?* 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
55,2 (69) 
44,8 (56) 
34,4 (11) 
65,6 (21) 
58,8 (114) 
41,2 (80) 
 An MP has very good contacts in the real estate market. Do you think it is corrupt that this MP… 
44 …gives his contacts to his daughter who works for a real estate agency. Doing so, she can acquire more real 
estate contracts.* 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
51,2 (64) 
48,8 (61) 
62,5 (20) 
37,5 (12) 
68,1 (130) 
31,9 (61) 
 A lawyer tries to get as many public contracts as possible. Therefore he makes a survey of the 
Page 32 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gpas
Policing & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
5 
 
assignments he already got and the assignments he would like to get and sends it to some of his contacts. 
Do you think it is corrupt that the lawyer sends this survey to… 
45 …that the lawyer sends his survey to his wife who is a minister, to get more assignments?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
32,0 (40) 
68,0 (85) 
12,5 (4) 
87,5 (28) 
40,2 (78) 
59,8 (116) 
 A tax official works on an audit office and treats the tax returns of his district. Do you think it is corrupt 
that the official… 
46 …provides against payment advice to friends in order to submit the best possible tax return in his district?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
44,4 (55) 
55,6 (69) 
15,6 (5) 
84,4 (27) 
45,9 (89) 
54,1 (105) 
47 …completes the tax return against payment in order to submit the best possible return in his district?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
37,9 (47) 
62,1 (77) 
9,4 (3) 
90,6 (29) 
38,7 (75) 
61,3 (119) 
 A customs officials checks a cargo of sports shoes that is declared with an international transport. He has 
doubts whether or not the cargo of shoes corresponds to the export licence. Therefore he takes samples 
out of the cargo to execute a material verification of the shoes. Do you think it is corrupt that… 
48 …the customs official simply takes more shoes than required for the verification?** 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
12,5 (8) 
93,6 (117) 
25,0 (8) 
75,0 (24) 
9,8 (19) 
90,2 (175) 
 A mayor visits the ministry office of a political associate to promote the finalization of a building file. Do 
you think it is corrupt that the mayor discusses a file to accelerate the construction… 
49 …that the mayor discusses a file to accelerate the construction of an industrial site in his municipality?* 
 not corrupt 
corrupt 
84,0 (105) 
16,0 (20) 
96,9 (31) 
3,1 (1) 
92,7 (179) 
7,3 (14) 
50 …that the mayor discusses a file to accelerate the construction of a golf course in his municipality?* 
 
not corrupt 
corrupt 
78,4 (98) 
21,6 (27) 
96,9 (31) 
3,1 (1) 
87,6 (169) 
12,4 (24) 
Chi-square: (*) Differences between membership status-group is significant on the level: p< 0.05*= p<0.01**=p<0.001*** 
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